Credit effects in the monetary mechanism : commentary by John C. Driscoll
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2002 237
ara Lown and Donald Morgan’s paper does two very
 important things. First, it draws attention to a data set 
that may shed new light on the effects of monetary policy, the 
financing choices of firms, and the industrial organization of 
the banking sector: the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey. Second, it reminds us that the bank lending 
market is more complex than common stories of the lending 
channel suggest—and that studying those complexities may 
help solve important macroeconomic questions. These 
comments fall under five headings: explaining why credit 
standards are important, discussing whether the variables 
chosen actually reflect differences in standards, describing how 
well the argument addresses endogeneity problems, 
interpreting the results, and suggesting future research.
Why Are Standards Important?
As Lown and Morgan remind us, obtaining a bank loan has two 
stages. First, banks decide whether to make loans at all, based 
on a set of standards the potential borrower must meet. 
Second, the bank and borrower must negotiate loan terms and 
quantity.
Traditional stories of the credit channel of monetary policy 
(for example, Bernanke and Blinder [1988]) have largely 
neglected the first stage. For most empirical studies, and even 
most of the (rather few) theoretical models, this is not 
problematic. Studies have seldom used loan interest rates; they 
instead attempt to determine whether exogenous shifts in 
monetary policy or bank-related variables cause changes in the 
quantity of bank loans or changes in macro-level variables and 
micro-level firm behavior. This focus on loan quantities leads 
to results equally consistent with a credit-rationing or a price-
increase story. In fact, a typical description of what happens 
during a credit crunch is that small firms are “unable to 
borrow” after a monetary policy contraction.
So why consider standards? Increases in standards are likely 
to reduce the quantity of bank lending—if firms are unwilling 
or unable to meet new standards. Hence, to the extent that 
changes in standards are exogenous, standards will be good 
instrumental variables for shifts in the loan supply.
There are at least four reasons why standards might change:
• Banks decide to change standards for reasons unrelated 
to the current or future state of the macroeconomy.
• Open market operations lead to changes.
• Banks tighten or ease lending as a result of moral 
suasion by the Fed.
• Banks change standards in response to perceived 
changes in loan demand.
The first reason might involve regulatory changes or 
changes in the industrial organization of the banking industry 
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that are unrelated to the economy as a whole. The next two 
reasons provide additional channels through which monetary 
policy can have real effects. Moral suasion is of particular 
interest as the return of an old idea that is now largely 
abandoned. I was once taught that there were four ways of 
carrying out monetary policy: performing open market 
operations, changing the discount rate, changing reserve 
requirements (or perhaps other banking regulations), or 
exerting “moral suasion.” Moral suasion includes attempts by 
the Fed to persuade banks to change their lending policies. 
Consider Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) discussion of 
monetary policy in 1919:
In April 1919, the Board gave serious consideration to the 
suggestion “ . . . that the discount rate be advanced.” Yet it 
restricted itself to moral suasion, urging banks to 
discriminate between “essential and non-essential 
credits”—a formula that successive use from that time has 
rendered neither less appealing to the Reserve System as a 
means of shifting responsibility nor more effective as a 
means of controlling monetary expansion (p. 222).
In discussing postwar policy, Friedman and Schwartz later 
characterize moral suasion as the Federal Reserve’s “traditional 
confession of impotence” (p. 580), a frequently used but also 
usually ineffective policy instrument. Finding that this policy 
instrument was more powerful than Friedman and Schwartz 
thought would have two important implications: standard 
estimates of the reaction function would give an incomplete 
accounting of Fed policy, and exploring moral suasion would 
also provide another way of determining the effects of 
monetary policy.
The fourth reason why standards might change—in 
response to perceived changes in demand—complicates efforts 
to discover the effects of the first three reasons. If banks 
perceive declining demand, they may choose to reduce the 
quantity of loans, in part by raising standards. In addition, in 
response to a recession, the pool of potential borrowers may 
possibly decline in quality—again leading lenders to raise 
borrowing standards.
Efforts to determine the effects of changes in standards are 
hence plagued by the usual identification problems associated 
with attempts to determine the effects of changes in monetary 
policy. The results of Lown and Morgan’s paper depend on 
how well this identification problem is handled. Ultimately, 
I find the authors’ way of addressing the problem suggestive 
but not fully persuasive.
Are Changes in Standards 
Measured Accurately?
The paper’s measure of credit standards is the net degree of 
tightening reported by senior loan officers for a sample of 
banks. As the authors note, this is a qualitative measure. By 
itself, that is not any more problematic than using the indexes 
of monetary policy developed by Romer and Romer (1989) or 
Boschen and Mills (1991). More troubling, however, is the 
potential for bias. Loan officers may have an incentive to tell 
the Fed what they think it wants to hear. As the authors note in 
a previous paper using this data set, this is particularly evident 
in the first part of the sample, in which there is no net easing. 
But even over the whole sample, there is a net tendency toward 
tightening. This might not matter if the bias were known to be 
constant. But it would matter if the bias were to be in the 
direction of actual or expected monetary policy. While it is 
difficult to assess whether this is true, I have been told by the 
current operators of the survey that the banks are reassured 
that there is a firewall between the research and regulatory 
branches of the Fed, a safeguard that would encourage honest 
reporting of responses.
How Well Is the Endogeneity 
Problem Addressed?
To the extent that credit standards simply respond endo-
genously to current and expected future changes in GDP, 
they cannot be considered to have real effects. Lown and 
Morgan are aware of this identification problem and attempt 
to control for it in two ways.
First, they include their standards measure in a vector 
autoregression model (VAR), in which identification is 
achieved using Sims’ (1980) method of ordering the variables 
so that the ones suspected to be most exogenous are first. The 
initial ordering has a group of real variables first, lending 
quantities and rates second, standards third, and the federal 
funds rate last. The second ordering moves the federal funds 
rate to a position between the lending quantity and lending 
rate.
These orderings are good first steps, but it is not clear that 
they truly capture exogenous components in the variables of 
interest, and they do not seem to allow tests of the hypotheses 
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ordering rules out the possibility that monetary policy can 
contemporaneously cause standards to change a priori. In both 
orderings, innovations in standards are allowed to be affected 
by innovations in all other variables contemporaneously; it 
does not sound as if the resulting orthogonalized innovations 
are truly exogenous. Other authors have, of course, previously 
done something similar to identify the exogenous component 
of the federal funds rate. But in those cases, the argument was 
supplemented by a consideration of institutional details of the 
federal funds market that showed that shifts in the demand for 
federal funds were accommodated. This paper needs a similar 
institutional argument. Moreover, this paper is open to some 
of the same criticisms about using VARs to identify policy 
shocks that have been leveled by Rudebusch (1998) and Faust 
(1998) and recently summarized in Stock and Watson (2001).
Second, Lown and Morgan compare their standards series 
with Romer and Romer’s (1989, 1993) dates for disinflations 
and for “credit actions” (that is, attempts by policymakers to 
use moral suasion or other means to directly affect lending). 
All seven dates identified by Romer and Romer correspond to 
large changes in the standards variable, a result that raises my 
confidence that the variables are capturing at least the 
exogenous changes. But this still leaves open what the other 
changes in standards correspond to. They could be exogenous 
policy changes or noise. They could also be endogenous policy 
responses. The problem is akin to comparing just the Romer 
and Romer disinflation dates to the federal funds rate; how we 
interpret changes in the federal funds rate at other dates is 
debatable.
How Do We Interpret the Results?
As in most VAR-based studies, it is difficult to determine the 
magnitude of the results. Since the VARs are in levels and no 
attempts at detrending have been made, it is also difficult to 
compare the results with other results in the literature. Thus, it 
is hard to determine whether the fact that a 100-basis-point 
shock to the federal funds rate causes a drop of less than 
1 percent in the level of output should be regarded as small 
or large.
As the authors note, the inclusion of the standards variable 
in the preferred ordering does cause the effects of the federal 
funds rate on output to drop, but the drop is not statistically 
significant or clearly economically significant. The results are 
more striking in the variance decompositions, although it is not 
clear why the ordering has been changed from that reported in 
the VARs or why the variance share of innovations in the 
federal funds rate is so much larger than I have seen in other 
papers. The price puzzle seemingly remains, and, oddly, the 
effects of innovations in lending rates on the quantity of 
lending are negligible.
More interestingly, standards have an almost immediate 
and large effect on output, regardless of the ordering. The effect 
is very long-lived, and it is not clear whether it eventually 
returns to zero. This does not look like the effect of a standard 
monetary policy shock (although the effects of the federal 
funds rate in this paper are rather similar). It makes me 
suspicious that what is in fact being picked up is an endogenous 
response of standards to changes in loan demand. But if the 
effect is genuine, there are interesting implications. First, to the 
extent that the Fed through its “credit actions” is causing some 
of this, we need to rethink our beliefs about the effects of 
monetary policy. Second, given the size and speed of impact, 
perhaps the Fed should be using credit actions more often and 
avoiding the slower working channels. Persuasion, threat, and 
intimidation should be the three instruments of monetary 
policy, not open market operations, discount rate changes, and 
reserve requirement changes.
Suggestions for Future Research
There are several alternative ways of controlling for 
endogeneity. First, one could try to base identification 
assumptions on a simple small model of the bank lending 
market, in the same way that Brunner (1994), Strongin (1995), 
and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) model the federal funds 
market. This approach would replace the Sims (1980) style of 
recursive ordering assumption with assumptions like those in 
Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard and Watson (1986). This is not 
a trivial task.
Second, it may be possible to use other questions in the 
survey to control for endogeneity, although data availability 
may make this difficult in practice. In the current version of the 
survey, the question immediately after the question on 
standards asks why standards have changed. Possible responses 
include “less favorable or more uncertain economic outlook,” 
“worsening of industry-specific problems,” and “reduced 
tolerance for risk.” The first response in particular seems well 240 Commentary
suited for addressing the endogeneity problem. The next 
question after this one asks directly whether loan demand is 
substantially stronger or weaker.
A set of questions added to the survey in the past few years 
asks about the responses of borrowers after standards have 
tightened. In the most recent survey, two-thirds of customers 
borrowed the same amount as planned, 18 percent borrowed 
somewhat less, 6 percent significantly less, and 10 percent not 
at all. Of the one-third who borrowed less, half either borrowed 
elsewhere or sold illiquid assets. These results suggest that most 
firms are able to find other forms of finance, which is evidence 
against both the effects of standards and the lending channel 
more generally. It would be interesting to revisit this question 
once a longer time series has been accumulated.
Determining whether there are differences in the behavior 
of small and large banks and between loans at prime and loans 
over prime would be helpful as well. Various papers on the 
lending channel (for example, Kashyap and Stein [2000]) have 
predicted that smaller banks should be more affected by 
changes in monetary policy, and almost all papers in this area 
have argued that smaller firms, many of which are likely to 
borrow at rates substantially over prime, are more subject to 
the lending channel.
Finally, Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999, 2000) have 
recently discovered another banking variable that has 
significant predictive power for output and that may be an 
instrument for exploring changes in the loan supply: the 
fraction of banks in poor financial health. It would be 
interesting to see how much additional explanatory power the 
standards variable has over the bank health variable.
Conclusion
As my comments indicate, I am not persuaded that the 
endogeneity problem has been solved for the standards 
variable. But standards do clearly have predictive power for 
output, and the results are worthy of further study with 
additional controls for endogeneity. The idea that moral 
suasion might have been—or may even still be—an important 
part of monetary policy deserves additional research. Finally, 
the entire Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey is a rich and 
underutilized resource, and Lown and Morgan deserve credit 
for bringing it to light.References
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